The French Election: The White Pill Version

Colin Liddell

I like to stick to my predictions. Otherwise what’s the point of making them? So, when I said Marine Le Pen would win the French Presidential Election some weeks ago, I stuck to my guns, even as the polls continued to show a massive gap.

This was because all the ingredients of a Le Pen win were there, and continued to be there—and still are!—while all that could be said for Macron is that he is a belated French version of Tony Blair and Barack Obama. My mistake was believing in French cynicism. I was disappointed to find that they were not cynical enough to see through such an obvious ploy as Macron. In future I will be more cynical about French cynicism.

The big question for me is not whether Le Pen—or someone like her—will win in the next decade or two. I believe that will definitely come to pass. Instead it is whether that will be enough to save France. I have strong doubts that it will, doubts I expressed back in 2012, when I wrote “The Death of France.”

But on the more basic question of whether Le Pen will be elected President, the outlook has to be positive. Although this election may seem like a setback, it was anything but. Le Pen got over a third of the vote. This included 44% of the 18-24 demographic, and if you were to sort that by race, it would go up by at least another 20 points for Whites of that age group. Unlike other countries, the nationalist vote in France is youthful. Macron by contrast scored 80% of the over-65 vote [insert joke about Macron’s wife here].

There is a lot of talk that Le Pen should have done better, especially with all the jihad that France has seen in recent years. That is true, but don’t let it get in the way of how well she actually did do.

She got 11 million votes, way above the 7.6 million votes her party achieved in the 2015 regional vote, and double what her father got in the second round of the 2002 Presidential Election. 53% of the working class voted for her, including 63% of agricultural workers, and we know that the police and probably the army are solidly behind her. In short, this is not just “progress” but a major advance.


Macron: receptacle for the despicable.

Also promising is the political landscape going forward. Macron comes in effectively as a “lame duck” President, with #MacronLeaks hanging over him. In order to get even this far, he had to “distance” himself from the old establishment parties, which means that he also has no political base in the French parliament. Unless he is the best deal maker ever, he is riding into the most ineffectual Presidency ever, and at a time when the forces of malcontent are surging on every side. It seems that the last card the establishment decided to play turned out to be the Joker.

On Le Pen’s side, there is plenty that is positive. This campaign has effectively detoxified the Front National brand. When her father got through to the final round in 2002, the country went into national mourning and there were emotive mass demonstrations against him. Not so this time. Marine is now seen as a legitimate choice for French voters, and, as we saw when she was mobbed by enthusiastic workers at the Whirlpool factory in Amiens, people are proud to associate with her.

This is why genuine Gaullist offshoot parties like Debout la France (DLF) and Union Populaire Républicaine (UPR) are now interested in working with her, and possibly merging to make a new Patriotic Party, one that would also allow her to shed the remaining “negative baggage” of the Front National.

It is clear that the Front National already has a strong appeal to Leftists. This can only increase if Le Pen is seen as the main opposition to a public-sector-cutting Macron. She also has a natural and logical appeal to the conservatives of Fillon’s Les Republicans, although this was largely offset by boomerist stupidity in this election. But that is soft rock that can easily be eroded.

In Merkel and Macron, the EU is now under the kind of management that can only exacerbate its many problems. These include various budgetary and economic problems, as well as the migrant invasion. These are problems that put increasing pressure on the political architecture of the EU.

Dysfunction and racial polarization can only grow in the years ahead. All those nice, cozy parts of France, where people voted for Macron because they lacked direct experience of the migrant flood, are going to learn things the hard way.

The 2017 election could very well be the last election in which one bunch of White people (cosmopolitans, boomers, and naive inhabitants of remote Whitopias) campaign against another bunch of White people (economically blighted youth and working class people living in or near “enriched” neighbourhoods), while non-Whites wait in the wings and look on.

In the years ahead, political battles will increasingly take on the hues of the discordant races and cultures thrown together by the failed multicultural experiment that is France.

Le Pepes

Unfinished business