The trouble with European politics is that the so-called “extreme” parties are not really extreme enough. This is especially clear from the case of France, where the comparatively mild policies of the Front National have been described throughout the campaign as “extreme” and “far right-wing.”
Like most people, I am not a fan of extremism. But we live in an era when extreme things are happening all around us, so to act with conventional moderation is the equivalent of turning down the heating when the house is on fire.
Centuries of history, including scores of major wars, dozens of invasions and revolutions, and tens of millions slaughtered in battle, have not sufficed to change the ethnic and cultural character or France. However, mass immigration and differential birth rates threaten to do what the likes of Attila the Hun, Moslem Crusaders, English longbowmen, French Revolutionaries, and German panzers failed to do: i.e. change France in its very essence.
In the last few decades, not only has the non-French population of France exploded, but amongst it that part which is inherently inassimilable and therefore anti-French predominates. In the past many non-French – such as Jews, Armenians, Spaniards, and Italians – became French, but now non-French usually means anti-French in that France will change to meet them, not the other way round.
The main reason why this anti-French strain has met with such demographic success is precisely because of its anti-French nature, not only in race but also in religion and culture.
Unlike French culture and identity, which has become the hollowed-out shell of negative buzzword virtues so typical of the West – “freedom,” “choice,” “tolerance,” etc. – the anti-French or anti-Western part of the population has an assertive, positive culture and identity that actually believes in precise and concrete things, even though we might think many of them odd or even repellent.
The positive character of this culture makes it incredibly difficult for those who are part of it to convert or assimilate to the negative culture created by Western socialism and liberalism. Against the empty abstractions of the French tricolour – liberté, égalité, fraternité – the Moslem sets submission to Allah, the inequality of Believers and Infidels (and men and women), and the brotherhood of the tribe; flesh and blood ideas instead of meaningless rhetoric.
The anti-Western nature of these colonizers is not some random fluke of history that can be reprogrammed by a bit of state-sponsored outreach. It is essential to who they are, why they are in France, and why they are demographically taking over. It created the poverty that drove them and their forbearers there and it creates the family and community structure that gives them a birth rate that mocks the feeble efforts of the liberal French to procreate.
This is the extreme reality that France, like much of the West, is experiencing. Yet, instead of extreme responses to maintain a normal situation, the political parties, even the so-called extreme ones, offer only moderate solutions that are powerless against the extremism of the situation.
Much was made of the fact that Marine Le Pen managed to attract around 19% of the vote in the recent French presidential elections. But what is she offering besides an attempt to work within the existing system to restrict immigration?
Even if she had been elected and the courts, the media, big business, the unions, and the EU had allowed her a free hand, this would merely have slowed down the process we now see underway, by which a low-grade, assertive culture, society, and racial mixture is replacing a highly-evolved, negative culture, society, and race. Marine Le Pen entering the Élysée Palace would have seemed rather like the Trojans bolting their city’s gates after trundling in the gift of the Greeks.
The moderate parties that supported the two final candidates do not wish for the death of France, but their solution to the intractable problem of demographic differentials is oddly quite an extreme one.
What they wish and hope for in their heart-of-hearts is the “cultural genocide” of the incomers, that is, the eradication of their Islamic culture to the point where it is as meaningless as Christianity now is in our society. It is assumed that just by being exposed to the wonders of French culture the Islamic masses will shed their own culture and identity like a dirty hijab and start living, breathing, and behaving like French people, right down to the minimal birth rate and women’s rights.
Needless to say this belief is hopelessly naïve. The destruction of France’s last real positive culture, namely its Christian medieval culture, took centuries and happened within a context that was uncomplicated by racial and identity factors. There is no reason to think that France can be saved by the instantaneous and painless Frenchification of the anti-French.
To save France – as this is in fact the only non-extreme result – much more extreme actions are necessary. In addition to clamping down on immigration, there also needs to be massive “exigration” (forced emigration) of the Anti-French. This can be done in a stick or carrot way, or by a combination of both, perhaps involving the removal of employment opportunities (as with South African Whites) and welfare, combined with a financial incentive to return to the historical Islamic world. One difficulty here would be arranging recipient countries, but perhaps France’s foreign aid budget could be utilized to oil the wheels.
In whatever way it was done it would be a tremendously costly and embarrassing operation for France, and one that the internationalist pride and universal pretensions of the country make almost unthinkable under present conditions.
Without exigration, the only other way to save France, short of race war and genocide, would be managed partition, giving parts of France to the Moslems to live in. As most of the demographically Moslem areas are in urban centres, this would not require a great sacrifice of territory but would mean the loss of high-value areas and lead to an awkward situation with dozens of self-ruling Moslem enclaves dotted around France to reflect the existing demographic reality.
Although this would be on a vastly greater scale, it would also bring to mind the Jewish ghettoes of the middle ages and evoke unpleasant associations that many French people would find unacceptable. A combination of practical difficulties, nimbyism, and disunity among French people would also make this solution highly unlikely.
We have considered three solutions for saving France from extinction, namely the cultural genocide favoured by the mainstream parties, as well as exigration and partition, two options that were not even put to voters in the French elections.
None of these are workable under conditions remotely similar to those that exist now. The only other route that would see the continuation of France into the 22nd century would be a horrific race war that the French won, which would lead to the expulsion or eradication of the anti-French population. This is even more unlikely, but would perhaps be a possibility under a state of extreme economic chaos and political breakdown.
Without any of these options, the Moslems will remain in France, they will reinforce their culture and their links with the Moslem world, more immigrants will come, and Moslems will keep on having much larger families than French people. Even a victory for Marine Le Pen can do nothing to stop this.
But what of the endgame? As the anti-French continue to grow as a proportion of the population, we can expect to see much greater polarization of the political process.
As we see in America, this process is heavily coded at first. Parties that once stood for abstract political principles or class interests become havens for specific ethnic groups. In America the Democratic Party’s emphasis on greater public spending and destroying the power of the old WASP elite have made it increasingly into the party of Jews, Blacks, and Hispanics, while the Republican Party’s message of national pride, property rights, and smaller government have ensured that its supporters are overwhelmingly White, although it still makes pointless attempts to attract support from the growing demographics.
In France a similar process will increasingly become apparent, although the existence of the Front National, a large marginalized party associated with the ethnic interests of the French, may complicate the picture and ironically even delay the breakdown of politics into a system of neatly coded ethnic difference.
Once the main political divisions have been codified to reflect race rather than class, politics will inevitably take on a more ethnic character and lead to more blatantly racial politics that will lead to an escalation of racial antagonism and mobilization along lines of race. This process will also be accelerated by the growing economic dislocations associated with a major shift in power as parties favour ethnic interests at the cost of political and ethnic rivals.
In the case of France, with the demographic and democratic power of Moslems growing at the centre, the French part of the population will seek to retain autonomy in other ways that do not rely on national ballots, parliaments, and presidents.
Anyone familiar with the administrative organization of France knows that it is a highly centralized state. This is because the underlying reality is far from centralized. The level of state control in effect hides and seeks to counteract real historical and provincial differences. Indeed, one reason a small state like England was able to successfully carry on war with France for so long, as in the Hundred Years War, was because France had deep divisions.
When the country was first divided into modern departments by the National Constituent Assembly in 1790, the boundaries of the departments were deliberately chosen to break up France’s historical regions and create units that would be too small to be autonomous. For example, important historical regions like Brittany and Normandy were broken up into four or five departments.
In the coded racial politics that will increasingly come to dominate French life, it can be expected that these ancient regional divisions, especially those where Whites remain a majority, will become intense focal points for political campaigns nominally in favour of greater local autonomy, but really in favour of racial and cultural autonomy.
Just as the SNP in the UK, the Basque nationalists in Spain, and the Northern League in Italy campaign for separation from an entity that has become increasingly alien to them, so in France, the loss of White power in the centre will see a revival of French regionalism in places like Brittany, Normandy, Burgundy, and Languedoc, around an Isle de France firmly in the grip of a new Caliphate.