Contrary to what most of the pundits are saying, the recent Oldham East and Saddleworth by-election in the UK was very revealing about the state and direction of British politics.
With Labour winning a seat they have held since its inception (42 percent of the vote), the Liberal-Democrats coming second with a marginally increased percentage of the vote (31.9 percent), and the Conservative vote being squeezed in a seat they had little hope of winning (12.8 percent), political commentators have been left with little of interest to remark on. But this is because they have been ignoring yet again the increasingly important substratum of British politics and how it impacts on the top flight.
I’m not about to say that the substratum parties—essentially the BNP, UKIP, and the Greens—are about to break through, but, with parties outside the big three scoring almost 12 percent of the vote in the last general election, how the political establishment deals with this increasingly important segment of the electorate will determine which of the big parties runs Britain and how.
The most significant fact of the 2010 general election was the narrowness of the result. After 13 years of economic mismanagement, rising taxes, and destructive social engineering, at a time of severe economic turbulence, and with a leader who lacked the glib charm now required by voters, the Labour Party should have been wiped out by the Conservatives.
As it was, there was only a 5 percent swing from Labour to Conservatives, so that the Conservatives were forced to rely on the help of Britain’s perpetual bridesmaid party, the Lib-Dems, to form what may yet prove to be ramshackle coalition.
At the Oldham East and Saddleworth by-election the smaller parties scored almost 12 percent of the vote, with UKIP getting 5.8 percent and the BNP, 4.5.
Voters who reject the three big Westminster parties are typically people who strongly resent the direction their country has taken towards becoming (a) a lackey of a globalist America, (b) a demographic colony of the third world, and (c) a province of the bureaucratic tyranny of the EU. In some political lexicons they might even be described as ‘nationalists’ and some may even view themselves as such, but the fact is that like the vast majority of the voters they lack a clear political identity.
In the UK, the main political identities are still pegged to class, with large segments of the population seeing themselves as either natural or traditional Labour voters or Conservatives. A yet larger group are either floaters, non-voters, or Lib-Dems (a kind of politically miscellaneous category).
The increasing size of the anti-big-three vote (BNP and UKIP) is mainly an effect of the speed with which the country has been moving in the direction of becoming a third-world dumping ground controlled from Brussels that sends its young men to die in Afghanistan.
During the weeks of campaigning that preceded the by-election, several events occurred. One that gave particular hope to the BNP was the massive news coverage finally given to an issue they had campaigned long and hard on, namely the sexual grooming of young and vulnerable White girls by gangs of Asian men, usually involving drugs, pimping, gang rape, and paedophile sex. This was due to a spate of ongoing trials that made it hard to ignore.
When the story broke, the mainstream media blanked out all mention of the BNP, while at the same time giving airtime and column inches to politicians from the big parties to pontificate on it. Jack Straw, the labour MP for Blackburn, who had turned a blind eye to this atrocity while serving as Home Secretary, was seen on air denouncing the practice in blandly measured and reassuring terms.
The BNP’s candidate in the by-election, Derek Adams, hit back, saying that Muslim sex grooming gangs had become a major issue only because the British National Party first raised it. “It is like immigration,” Mr Adams continued. “No-one dared mention it until we in the British National Party started getting good votes.”
The media blackout on the BNP prevented them reaping the benefit of their long campaign, and allowed the other parties to steal their thunder.
The election was also notable for the usual attempts to physically intimidate the BNP. At one meeting Mr. Adams was forcibly removed by police after politicians from other parties objected to his presence, while elsewhere members of Unite Against Fascism (sic) physically attacked BNP leader Nick Griffin as he arrived at a venue in London where he was due to hold a Q&A session on the documentary film The Battle of Barking. Later Mr. Griffin complained about police standing by and doing nothing to prevent the violence.
This kind of no-platform policy backed up by the constant threat of violence is just the tip of the iceberg. In 2009 and 2010 the BNP was financially hamstrung by a major legal attack launched by the government over its membership criteria.
The BNP also claims with some justification that UKIP and certain smaller nationalist parties are boosted by the establishment, through financial support and friendly media coverage, as a kind of safety valve to draw support away from them.
In the case of Oldham East and Saddleworth the statistics suggest this might be the case. In the 2001 election, the first one the BNP fought in this working-class North of England constituency, they took an impressive 11.2 percent of the vote, while fellow nationalists UKIP gained just 1.5 percent. This is because UKIP, often described as “BNP for the Middle Classes,” is a party identified with the south of England and the suburbs, rather than the post-industrial urban North, like Oldham East and Saddleworth.
By the 2005 election, the BNP’s vote in the constituency had fallen to 4.9 percent, while, at the same time, UKIP, a party whose political appeal parallels the BNP’s in that it is broadly nationalist, had climbed to 2 percent. In last year’s general election, the BNP recovered a bit to 5.7 percent, but UKIP nearly doubled to 3.9. Then in the recent by-election UKIP topped the BNP with 5.8 percent to 4.5 percent. This dynamic alone points to the boosting of an “acceptable” nationalist party at the expense of one considered “unacceptable” by various unacknowledged forces.
Needless to say, the BNP’s large vote in 2001 rang alarm bells, leading to a concerted, well-financed, and multi-faceted campaign to counteract it. In addition to the usual political methods, such campaigns also involve infiltration and disruption of the BNP, smear campaigns, and economic incentives, including the threat of economic isolation if the constituency opts for the BNP. The same tactics were very effective in Barking, where an earlier BNP breakthrough at council level was later nullified, although here ethnic replacement also seems to have played a major part.
As the BNP has no real chance of becoming a government anytime soon, it is remarkable that so much trouble is taken by the establishment to prevent it even reaching its natural audience, the disenchanted White working class in places like Oldham East and Saddleworth that have been on the receiving end of the kind of multiculturalism and anti-White racism that sees Muslim gangs rape and humiliate what are technically White children.
Labour’s antipathy for the BNP is understandable in pure Machiavellian terms—they are in direct competition for the same voters—but the attitude of the Conservative party makes absolutely no political sense. While a strong BNP vote typically depresses the Labour vote, something that could make it easier for the Conservatives to achieve the Holy Grail of an outright majority, a strong UKIP vote, by contrast, is likely to draw votes mainly from them. Because of this, it would clearly suit the Conservatives if the BNP became the dominant nationalist party. Instead, the Conservatives, along with the rest of the political establishment and the mainstream media, work overtime to unwittingly ensure that UKIP remain the pre-eminent nationalist force.
In the 2010 General Election, which produced the hung parliament and the fragile coalition we now see, the Conservatives got 36.1 percent of the vote and Labour 29 percent, while UKIP got 3.1 and BNP, 1.9. As Britain still votes along class lines, an increased BNP vote would actually have resulted in less Labour support rather than less UKIP support, while a decreased UKIP vote would have seen its largely middle class voters return to the Tory fold.
Turning the figures around, 3.1 percent for the BNP and 1.9 for UKIP, would probably have seen a drop in Labour support to around 28 percent and a rise in Conservative support to over 37, enabling them to form a majority government without the assistance of the Lib-Dems.
The Conservative Party, however, seem content to be the stupid party in this equation, effectively engaging in an act of political self castration. Unless they change tack, the party’s course ensures they will always be either in opposition or coalition, but never fully in government.
Labour meanwhile will work overtime to maintain the British political establishment’s collective demonization of the BNP, while at the same time doing what it can to surreptitiously boost UKIP, essentially because it suits its interests vis-à-vis the Conservatives. This is the story of Oldham East and Saddleworth that the pundits appear to have missed